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Miękkie ograniczenia budżetowe. Esej wprowadzający do tomu IV Dzieł wybranych
The soft budget constraint. An Introductory Study to Volume IV of the Life’s Work Series

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János Kornai
Department of Economics
Fovam ter 8, H-1093 Budapest, Hungary
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doi: 10.7366/1898352943001


SŁOWA KLUCZOWE

miękkie ograniczenia budżetowe, ratowanie zadłużonych przedsiębiorstw, przedsiębiorstwa przynoszące straty, pokusa nadużycia, niespójność czasowa

KEYWORDS

soft budget constraint, bail-out, loss-making enterprise, moral hazard, time inconsistency

STRESZCZENIE

Autor po raz pierwszy zajął stanowisko na temat miękkich ograniczeń budżetowych w 1976 roku. W ciągu kolejnych czterdziestu lat poczyniono znaczne postępy na drodze do pełniejszego zrozumienia tego zagadnienia. Dlatego autor nie zgadza się na zawężanie zakresu stosowania tego pojęcia do procesu ratowania nierentownych przedsiębiorstw socjalistycznych. Wykazuje, że syndrom miękkich ograniczeń budżetowych może wystąpić w różnych organizacjach i formach w wielu dziedzinach gospodarki oraz wskazuje na różnorodność dostępnych środków, z których finansuje się udzielaną pomoc. Pojedyncze działania ratunkowe nie tworzą syndromu miękkich ograniczeń budżetowych. Powstaje on dopiero wtedy, gdy miękkie ograniczenia budżetowe stają się elementem oczekiwań podmiotów gospodarczych. Szczególną uwagę zwrócono na następstwa tego rodzaju postępowania odpowiednio dla organizacji ratujących oraz ratowanych. W pracy zawarto przegląd doniesień na temat rozprzestrzeniania się omawianego syndromu na różnych etapach funkcjonowania systemów socjalistycznego i kapitalistycznego, a także w różnych rodzajach organizacji. Autor prezentuje własne poglądy w kwestiach normatywnych, proponując zabezpieczenia przed szkodliwym wpływem przedmiotowego syndromu.

ABSTRACT

The author’s ideas on soft budget constraint (SBC) were first expressed in 1976. Much progress has been made in understanding the problem over the ensuing four decades. The study takes issue with those who confine the concept to the process of bailing out loss-making socialist firms. It shows how the syndrome can appear in various organizations and forms in many spheres of the economy and points to the various means available for financial rescue. Single bailouts do not as such generate the SBC syndrome. It develops where the SBC becomes built into expectations. Special heed is paid to features generated by the syndrome in rescuer and rescue organizations. The study reports on the spread of the syndrome in various periods of the socialist and the capitalist system, in various sectors. The author expresses his views on normative questions and on therapies against the harmful effects, He deals first with actual practice, then places the theory of the SBC in the sphere of ideas and models, showing how it relates to other theoretical trends, including institutional and behavioural economics and theories of moral hazard and inconsistency in time. He shows how far the intellectual apparatus of the SBC has spread in theoretical literature and where it has reached in the process of „canonization” by the economics profession. Finally, he reviews the main research tasks ahead.

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SUGEROWANE CYTOWANIE / SUGGESTED CITATION

Kornai J. (2014), Miękkie ograniczenia budżetowe. Esej wprowadzający do tomu IV Dzieł wybranych, Zarządzanie Publiczne nr 4 (30), s. 5-30.
 

 

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